Crowdsourcing relies on online platforms to connect a community of users to perform specific tasks.
Introduction
Crowdsourcing contests are widely used as a means for generating ideas and solving problems (e.g., TopCoder, Taskcn, Kaggle) through the hosting of open contests online. Many firms, including General Electric, NASA, and Procter and Gamble, have used crowdsourcing as part of their research and development (R&D) processes.
1 Because of the unprecedented scale of the potential workforce for firms to generate new ideas and innovative solutions (Boudreau and Lakhani 2013) , many firms and governmental agencies have integrated crowdsourcing into their R&D process.
As a type of digital platforms, crowdsourcing platforms provide flexibility for online users to organically generate new and diverse ideas (Yoo et al. 2012) . The diversity and openness are critical to the innovation process (Shin et al. 2012) . However, if platform owners do not manage users carefully, such flexibility may cause some users to behave undesirably, which can divert from the platform's objective.
This renders the value of the crowdsourcing platforms questionable , Tilson et al. 2010 ). For instance, psychologists have shown that individuals tend to be more confident about information that can be retrieved easily Kahneman 1974, Griffin and Tversky 1992) . In other words, humans tend to rely on information that is explicitly shown to them rather than information that is presented implicitly.
This phenomenon is also known as the salience bias (Camacho et al. 2011, Griffin and Tversky 1992) .
When a salience bias is present on a crowdsourcing platform, some salient information, such as in-progress feedback provided in a crowdsourcing contest, may be over-emphasized by the contestants. This bias could systematically affect the performance of every worker on the platform.
Because some undesirable user behaviors, such as those resulting from the salience bias, may be detrimental to the functioning of the crowdsourcing platform, it is unclear how crowdsourcing platforms can perform effectively in such situations. This paper adopts the lens of behavioral economics and tournament theory to examine the possible salience effect of feedback information provided during a contest which has implications on the ability of crowdsourcing platforms to respond to the negative causes that 1 https://www.ideaconnection.com/open-innovation-success/ (Link accessed on 6/20/2017) misalign platform activity with the desired platform objective.
Two critical effects contribute to the quality of crowdsourcing outcomes: the parallel path effect (Boudreau et al. 2011 ) and the competition effect (Boudreau et al. 2016) . The parallel path effect refers to a greater likelihood of obtaining a desirable solution when the number of contestants increases; the competition effect suggests that by facing more competitors, high-ability contestants are more likely to be motivated to put more effort into creating new solutions. With the power of the parallel path effect, systematic bias in crowdsourcing contests may be reduced by including more contestants with smaller systematic bias. This argument is particularly valid when systematic bias that can negatively affect the performance of a crowdsourcing worker can be attenuated in some way. By contrast, if contestants perceive different feedback information with bias, the competition effect would cause the crowdsourcing outcome to deviate further from its objective as a result of high-ability contestants being stimulated to work harder in a particular direction given by the biasedly perceived feedback. This could create an inferior outcome and weaken the power of crowdsourcing contests. From a firm's perspective, investing in an innovation that is subject to systematic bias in crowdsourcing contests may result in inefficient resource management.
To examine how goal-misaligned user behavior can affect the performance of a crowdsourcing platform, we investigated whether crowdsourcing platforms can be immune to individual biases such as the salience bias. Specifically, we addressed the following three research questions: (1) Does the salience bias influence the performance of the crowdsourcing platform? (2) As suggested by the crowdsourcing literature, the competition effect may amplify the influence of the salience bias, whereas the parallel path effect may reduce the influence of the salience bias. Which effect has a greater influence on the impact of the salience bias? (3) Are there any effective mechanisms for alleviating the salience bias on crowdsourcing platforms?
We addressed these research questions by using an archival data set from Kaggle, a crowdsourcing contest platform for predictive modeling, paired with the results of a survey we conducted among Kaggle contestants. These research questions are important to our understanding of the behaviors of the emerging online community for data science. Very few studies have systematically analyzed the behaviors of data scientists. As more companies now rely on crowdsourcing contests to access analytics talents, and more crowdsourcing platforms are available for predictive modeling (e.g., Kaggle, CrowdAnalytix, DrivenData, and Datascience.net), recognizing the cognitive biases that these online contestants may be subject to when they compete in crowdsourcing contests is important for contest holders and crowdsourcing platforms to design contests in ways that can achieve desirable outcomes. It is especially intriguing in our research context (i.e., Kaggle contests) whether online contestants can overcome these cognitive biases, since both feedback and outcome are measured based on objective metrics and data scientists are expected to make best use of data for optimal decision making. It is therefore interesting to examine whether salience bias plays a significant role in these crowdsourcing contests. Our study also examines different factors that may moderate the effect of salience bias in crowdsourcing contests, such as the number of contestants, reward size, experience, and information cues in contest description. These moderating effects have not been examined by prior studies on salience bias.
Our results provide evidence of the salience bias among crowdsourcing contestants and show that it has a substantial effect on crowdsourcing outcomes. In addition, this salience effect is prevalent, despite the fact that our survey results of Kaggle participants indicate that they recognize the limitations of the feedback information provided during the contests and have the ability to cross-check the usefulness of the information. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the impact of the salience bias is amplified when the competition effect dominates, but the impact is mitigated when the parallel path effect dominates.
Nevertheless, our results suggest that the salience bias remains persistent among contest winners, regardless of whether the parallel path effect is dominant. These findings have profound implications for both firms (i.e., seekers) and platform designers. In contrast to the suggestions of some economists (e.g., List 2011), our results showed that competition does not necessarily eliminate individual biases. In other words, systematic bias can still exist at the aggregate level, producing inferior outcomes. Such bias thus reduces the effectiveness of crowdsourcing contests. Furthermore, increasing the number of contestants acts as a double-edged sword-it can enhance both the parallel path effect and the competition effect. Therefore, increasing the number of contestants does not necessarily attenuate systematic bias. Raising workers' awareness of cognitive biases can be more effective in alleviating the impact of salience bias.
We also studied two parameters related to the impact of salience bias: contestant experience and contest reward size. Our results suggested that the more experienced the workers are, the less likely it is that they will exhibit the salience effect. This coincides with findings in the literature showing that experienced workers are usually more rational than inexperienced workers (List 2003) . Hence, contest holders should consider ways to encourage more experienced contestants to participate in their contests.
Finally, we also found that the impact of the salience effect was stronger in contests with a larger reward.
This can be explained by monetary rewards being able to stimulate contestants to put more effort into improving their solutions in the direction given by the biasedly perceived feedback. Hence, we further suggest that over-incentivizing could also create an inferior crowdsourcing outcome because of the interaction between reward size and the salience effect. These guidelines may assist platform owners and firms in designing more efficient systems and creating quality crowdsourcing outcomes.
Literature Review

Productivity and Social Welfare of Digital Platforms
The main contribution of this paper is that it shows how the individual behaviors of online users can affect the productivity of a digital platform. Various studies have investigated how the community plays a role in the productivity of such platforms. For instance, the literature examines how the size of a community affects the economics (Rochet and Tirole 2006) and social welfare (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005) of the digital infrastructure and the platforms. When the network size increases, the utility of the agents on two sides of the market also increases (Katz and Shapiro 1985) . Although increasing the size of the community may increase demand for and profits of a platform, it may reduce the incentive that drives innovation effort (Boudreau 2012) , which might hurt the generativity (Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013) of the platform.
The behavior of a platform community may evolve over time. The incentives for participation and productivity of an online crowd depend on the participation cost, relevancy of the community (Butler et al. 2014) , and diversity of the community (Ren et al. 2015) . Apart from the size of the community, individual biases may also be detrimental to the social welfare of digital platforms. For example, studies have shown that mistrust among users can reduce resource allocation efficiency on crowdfunding platforms (Burtch et al. 2014, Lin and Viswanathan 2016) . However, the problems caused by this type of mistrust could be solved by an online feedback system (Ba 2001 , Dellarocas 2003 . This paper extends the literature by elucidating how individual biases can lower or raise the productivity of digital platforms.
User Behavior in Crowdsourcing Contests
This paper also contributes to the crowdsourcing literature by analyzing how the behavioral anomalies of crowdsourcing workers jeopardize the crowdsourcing outcome. Currently, theories in the crowdsourcing literature focus on how the solution quality is affected by contest parameters such as the number of contestants (Terwiesch and Xu 2008 , Boudreau et al. 2011 , Boudreau et al. 2016 , reward size (Liu et al. 2014) , experience and expertise of the contestants (Jeppesen and Lakhani 2010 , Bayus 2013 , Huang et al. 2014 , the perceived ease of use of the platform (Blohm et al. 2016) , and the structure of the crowdsourcing teams (Dissanayake et al. 2015) . However, none of these studies have addressed the behavioral anomalies of crowdsourcing workers or how these anomalies can affect the solution outcomes of crowdsourcing contests. According to our research, only Liu et al. (2014) have investigated behavioral anomalies on crowdsourcing platforms. They showed that high-ability workers tend to avoid entering a crowdsourcing contest that already has a high-ability incumbent. Our paper differs from that study because we investigate one type of cognitive bias that can be applied to everyone on the platform, not only to the high-ability contestants. Hence, the overall performance of the crowd could be affected systematically. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing research focusing on how systematic biases affect the outcomes of a crowdsourcing platform.
Furthermore, a number of studies in the area of crowdsourcing contests are grounded in tournament theory. In particular, Connelly et al. (2014) identified a research gap regarding how cognitive bias can affect tournament outcomes. Among all the findings in the literature on tournament theory, the most studied systematic biases in tournament applications are risk-related (Becker and Huselid 1992 , Pope and Schweitzer 2011 , Berger and Pope 2011 . Our study contributes to this research stream by clarifying how a specific cognitive bias-the salience bias, which changes how workers perceive feedback informationcan also influence tournament outcomes.
In-progress Feedback in Crowdsourcing Contests
There have been a few studies that examine the impact of in-progress feedback on crowdsourcing outcomes. Yang et al. (2009) discuss the role of feedback in crowdsourcing contests but do not empirically examine the impact of feedback on the contestants. Adamczyk et al. (2011) combine a survey and a clustering analysis to study how contestants use feedback differently in a crowdsourcing contest. However, this paper does not investigate the mechanism by which feedback affects contestants' performance. Bockstedt et al. (2016) argue that crowdsourcing contestants who submit earlier have a better chance to win because their solutions are more likely to be evaluated carefully by the seekers, who evaluate solutions effectively when only a few solutions are submitted.
Most relevant to our study, Wooten and Ulrich (2017) discuss the role of feedback in a crowdsourcing contest for logo design using a field experiment. They suggest that providing in-progress feedback to the contestants may lead to less variation in submissions because the contestants are likely to tailor their submissions towards the seeker's preferences revealed in the feedback. In their context, following the feedback is rational because the feedback reveals the seekers' preferences, which are directly linked to how the winners will be selected. In contrast, our paper studies a cognitive bias that likely leads to inferior outcome when the contestants over-emphasize the in-progress feedback that may not be aligned with the objective of the contestants, i.e., winning the contest.
Broadly speaking, our difference with Wooten and Ulrich (2017) is also a key difference between our study and almost all prior studies that examine the role of in-progress feedback in crowdsourcing contests. That is, in prior studies, the feedback is typically based on subjective opinions of seekers who are also the ones selecting the final winners. Therefore, it is natural and rational for the contestants to follow the feedback from the seekers because it reveals the seekers' preferences. In contrast, in our research context, the final performance is evaluated based on objective measures and following the feedback can lead to inferior outcomes, and yet the contestants still over-emphasize the feedback because of the cognitive bias. This bias has not been examined in this stream of research. We contribute to this stream of research by showing that in-progress feedback -even if it is objectively measured -may still be misaligned with the objective of the contestants (i.e., winning the contest) and induce salience bias among the contestants. This deepens our understanding of how in-progress feedback may affect the outcomes of crowdsourcing contests.
Study Context: Kaggle
Kaggle is a platform that allows firms (or seekers) to post their data and describe problems to seek solutions. Most of these problems are hosted as a contest, for which seekers can define their own rules. The contestants on the platforms can view the rules before deciding whether to participate in a contest. The contest winners typically can receive a reward, which might be money, a work opportunity, or an opportunity to attend a conference.
Most contests on Kaggle are predictive modeling problems. In these contests, seekers provide a training set and a test set to the contestants. The training set contains both inputs and outputs for the contestants to train their model, whereas the test set contains only the input data. The objective for the contestants is to use their trained model to predict the output of the test set (which is not visible to them).
The contestants are allowed multiple uploads of the solutions they derive from the test set during the learning phase. Every time a contestant uploads his or her solution, the system will show the score of the uploaded solution to the contestant; this score is called public score. The highest public score of the contestant will be posted on a public leaderboard ( Figure 1a ) that is viewable by every contestant.
The public score does not determine the final ranking of the contestants-it is merely a performance indicator of the effectiveness of the contestants' solutions, and is based on only a certain proportion of the test set (the contestants are not informed of which proportion of the test set that the score is derived from).
As shown at the top of the leaderboard in Figure 1a , the public scores were calculated from 30% of the test set.
By the end of the contest, the contestants select the solutions that can maximize their chance of winning based on their own evaluation and the public scores of the solutions. This process is known as the submission phase. After the contest is over, the final ranking of the contest (private leaderboard) will be announced, which is determined by a score called the private score. Neither the private score nor the private leaderboard is revealed to the contestants until the contest is over. The private score evaluates a solution in the same way as the public score, except that it uses only the proportion of the test set that is not used in calculating the public score. For example, the private scores shown in Figure 1b were computed using the remaining 70% of the test set. 
Hypothesis Development
During the contest, the contestants develop solutions using the training set in the learning phase and select solutions in the submission phase to maximize their chance of winning. In the learning phrase, the contestants should evaluate their model by predicting its out-of-sample performance on the test set. A common practice is to cross-validate the model to obtain a generalized predictive model (i.e. a predictive model that minimizes the out-of-sample errors). For example, cross-validation (e.g., k-fold cross-validation)
is part of the curriculum of many popular machine learning online courses. 2 Such a practice often leads to a relatively accurate estimation of the out-of-sample errors. Theoretically, the expectation of the sample errors obtained through cross-validation is the same as the expectation of the true out-of-sample errors (Abu-Mostafa et al. 2012, p. 139) . Hence, contestants in predictive modeling contests should be able to evaluate their own solutions without any feedback from the platform by using statistical methods such as cross-validation on the training set. We refer to this as the internal evaluation of the solutions by the contestant himself or herself.
When the contestants upload their solutions, their public scores provide another more salient feedback on how well their solution performs in addition to the performance of their internal evaluation.
Many studies have shown that the salience bias affects the decisions of individuals, including professionals (e.g., Camacho et al. 2011, Rudi and Drake 2014) . When a piece of information is explicitly presented to an individual, he or she tends to be overconfident about the information. For example, in the case of recruitment screening, a recruiter might focus on the warmth of a reference letter first and then adjust his or her perception of the letter by considering the credibility of the writer. However, according to Griffin and Tversky (1992) , such adjustment is often insufficient for predicting actual performance. Hence, it creates a salience bias that causes the recruiter to be overconfident about the explicitly presented information (i.e., the warmth of the letter). Similarly, in the Kaggle community, anecdotal evidence shows that salience bias is common.
3
In predictive modeling contests, contestants are ideally supposed to improve the accuracy of their 2 Coursera: https://www.coursera.org/specializations/machine-learning Udacity: https://www.udacity.com/course/intro-to-machine-learning--ud120 (Links accessed on 6/18/2017) 3 Sismanis (2010) , an experienced Kaggle contestant, shared his experience after he realized that overfitting the public scores while deemphasizing internal evaluations based on cross-validation was a "bad" (irrational) choice: ". . . the discrepancies between my own cross-validations and the leader-board made me believe that much more complicated models were required, and I soon abandoned the basic principles of [devising] the winning submission. I tried more complicated models while relaxing the regularization efforts. In retrospect, this was a bad decision on my part; I should have realized earlier the importance of regularization, and the potential of overfitting for such a small test data set."
out-of-sample predictions when developing their solutions. If the solutions are not biased to any data set, the out-of-sample prediction errors should be similar for any out-of-sample data set. Formally, we denote the score function ( , ) for the prediction accuracy of algorithm given data set . The more accurately predicts , the higher the score ( , ) will be. Given two test sets 1 and 2 , which are drawn from the same population, we expect that ( ( 1 , )) = ( ( 2 , )). Similarly, if the data sample for the public score is and the data sample for the private score is , when both and are drawn from the same population, the difference between the public and private scores when is unbiased is expected to be zero: (Δ ) = 0, where Δ = ( , ) − ( , ). However, if the salience effect of the public scores cause any contestants to intentionally train their model mainly according to the feedback while deemphasizing an internal evaluation based on cross-validation-which is a practice also known as overfitting-then the predictive error for will be smaller than the predictive error for . Hence, (Δ ) > 0; that is, over time the public scores will be systematically higher than the private scores in the presence of the salience bias.
When the salience bias is present, the difference between public and private scores will also likely increase as a contestant receives more feedback. Every time a contestant uploads a solution online, the contestant receives the public score for the solution as the feedback. If there is no salience bias towards the public score feedback, the contestant should not favor any portion of the test set when developing future solutions, so the public and private scores should increase by a similar magnitude if there is any new improvement on future solutions. However, if there is salience bias, the more public scores the contestant receives, the more salient the public score feedback is, and the more likely the contestant will improve the next solution in the direction of getting a better public score, i.e., the more likely the contestant will overfit the portion of the test set for deriving public scores when developing future solutions. Therefore, we hypothesize that the more feedback a contestant receives, the more likely the public score of the next solution developed by the contestant is higher than its private score. In other words, the score difference (i.e., [Δ ]) increases as the contestants receive more feedback because of the salience bias. Accordingly, we formulated our first hypothesis as follows: The salience bias can appear in both the learning and submission phases. In the submission phase, the contestants re-evaluate their models by predicting their out-of-sample performance on the test set to select which models to submit as their final solutions. Similar to the learning phase, the contestants should be able to evaluate their own solutions without any feedback from the platform by using statistical methods such as cross-validation with the training set. We can thus follow the same logic as that used in the learning phase to argue that, ideally, if the contestants are not biased toward any portion of the test set, the out-ofsample prediction errors should be the same for any portion of the out-of-sample test set; therefore, the chance of a solution with a higher public score being selected in the submission phase should match that of a solution with a higher private score being selected. However, because of the salience bias, the contestants may rely on the public score more than their internal evaluation, which biases them toward solutions with higher public scores (i.e., the solutions that overfit the portion of the test set for deriving the public scores).
Therefore, we can observe a similar pattern in the submission phase: because of the salience bias, solutions with high public scores are more likely to be selected as final solutions than solutions with high private scores.
Hypothesis 2: Because of the salience effect, solutions with high public scores are more likely to be selected as final solutions than solutions with high private scores during the submission phase.
Another crucial question we are investigating is whether the outcome of crowdsourcing contests can be immune from the salience bias. Because the quality of the contest outcome is ultimately determined by the quality of the solutions submitted by the winners, if the winners are unaffected by the salience bias, the seeker can still receive the desired outcome from the contest. However, because a salience bias is likely to systematically affect every contestant-including those who eventually win the contests, even when the parallel path effect is at work-it may not necessarily completely eliminate the negative impact of the salience bias. Hence, Hypotheses 1 and 2 should also apply to the prize winners. Consequently, we hypothesize that the salience bias affects the winners as well.
Hypothesis 3. A salience bias exists among the prize winners of a crowdsourcing contest in both the learning and submission phases.
The following examines how the parallel path effect and competition effect moderate the influence of the salience bias on the winners. When there is a sufficient number of contestants, both the parallel path effect (Boudreau et al. 2011 ) and competition effect (Boudreau et al. 2016 ) are at work. These two effects differ in how they influence the impact of the salience bias. The parallel path effect mainly pertains to the quality of the winning solutions, whereas the competition effect is mostly about the effort of the high-ability contestants (e.g., winners in our context).
The parallel path effect suggests that increasing the number of contestants increases the likelihood of finding an extreme value solution (or better winning solution). Although increasing the number of competitors in a contest may also reduce the overall incentives of the competitors to exert effort, Boudreau et al. (2011) suggest that the parallel path effect dominates the overall effort-reducing effect for more uncertain problems. Since predictive modeling problems are typically high-uncertainty problems and can benefit from having a diverse workforce to look for the best approach or path to a solution, the parallel path effect should dominate the overall effort-reducing effect in our context.
The competition effect suggests that a higher number of contestants leads to high-ability contestants exerting a stronger effort in improving and evaluating their solutions according to the public scores and their internal evaluation (Boudreau et al. 2016) . When a salience bias is at work, however, such contestants can expend greater effort under the guidance of salient information and are thus more likely to place greater emphasis on the public scores (Hypothesis 1). Consequently, winners may be subjected to a stronger salience bias than they would be in a contest with few contestants.
During the learning phase, both the parallel path effect and competition effect are at work.
Therefore, we developed two competing hypotheses about the salience bias in the learning phase:
Hypothesis 4a (Dominating parallel path effect). During the learning phase, as the number of contestants
increases, the impact of the salience bias on the winners' solutions is reduced.
Hypothesis 4b (Dominating competition effect). During the learning phase, as the number of contestants increases, the impact of the salient bias on the winners' solutions is further amplified.
There are two main tasks in predictive modeling contests: creating new solutions and evaluating existing solutions. During the learning phase, contestants have already exerted effort improving and evaluating their solutions. Hence, during the submission phase, the contestants require considerably less effort 4 when selecting the solutions compared with that required during the learning phase, because most of the work has already been completed during the learning phase. The parallel path effect should thus dominate the competition effect during the submission phase. Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. During the submission phase, as the number of contestants increases, the influence of the salience bias on the winners' solutions is attenuated.
Model
This section introduces two models to examine the proposed hypotheses. We tested our hypotheses by examining (a) the hypothesized patterns in the score differences and (b) the types of solutions that are more likely to be selected as the final solutions. Table 1 lists the definitions of the main variables.
Learning Phase Model
As suggested in Hypothesis Development (Section 4), the salience bias can systematically lead to higher public scores than private scores if the contestants train the model mainly according to the feedback (i.e., the public score) while deemphasizing cross-validation. The indicator variable that shows whether solution j of contestant i is chosen by the contestant to submit in contest c as a final solution.
#
The number of feedback that contestant i receives before uploading solution j in contest c.
The time elapsed (in minutes) when contestant i uploaded solution j in contest c starting from the time when the contestant uploaded his/her first solution in contest c divided by his/her total time available in contest c.
̃
The normalized final rank based on the public score of solution j among other solutions of contestant i in contest c.
The normalized final rank based on the private score of solution j among other solutions of contestant i in contest c.
The indicator variable that shows whether contestant i is a winner of contest c.
#
The total number of contestants in contest c.
Formally, the public and private scores of the jth solution uploaded by contestant i in each contest c are denoted as and , respectively. Specifically, ( ) measures the prediction accuracy of an algorithm created by contestant i for solution j in contest c when applied to the data sample contributing to the public score (private score) calculation in contest c. The score difference is defined as the difference between the public and private scores; that is, Δ = − .
An intuitive approach for testing whether the salience bias exists during the learning phase is to determine whether the score difference is systematically greater than zero (i.e., [Δ ] > 0) and how Δ changes as the number of feedback increases. However, Kaggle allows each seeker to use different measurements in evaluating the prediction accuracy of their solutions. To be consistent across all contests, Δ is standardized for each contest by (a) switching the sign of the scores that are aimed to be minimized so that higher scores always indicate an improvement, and (b) normalizing the magnitude of Δ for each contest, so that the magnitudes of Δ are comparable among all contests. In particular, some evaluation scores fall between the range of 0 and 1 (e.g., Area Under Curve), whereas others have no upper bound (e.g., Root Mean Squared Error). We constructed the standardized score difference of each solution j of contestant i in contest c as follows:
where (Δ ) is the sample standard deviation of Δ in contest c. Theoretically, if the contestants do not overfit their models to public scores, as suggested in Hypothesis Development (Section 4), the expected difference between the public and private scores should be zero, the mean of Δ should be zero, and
To examine Hypothesis 1, we first investigated the sign of Δ using Wilcoxon signed rank test as a nonparametric test for pairwise comparisons. To study whether Δ increases with the number of feedback, we constructed a linear regression model in which Δ is the dependent variable, and used the number of feedback (# ) received by contestant i before the contestant uploads the jth solution in contest c as an independent variable. We performed logarithmic transformation on the variable # to correct its skewed distribution (Gelman and Hill 2007) . Thus, the following baseline learning phase model was derived:
where 1 and 2 are the coefficients and is the error term. To control for any potential trend in score differences over time, we included the variable , which measures the "time of submission" and is computed as: the time elapsed (in minutes) when contestant i uploaded solution j in contest c starting from the time when the contestant uploaded his/her first solution in contest c, divided by his/her total time available in contest c. 5 We also included the fixed effects for contest c ( ) and contestant i ( ) to control for the idiosyncratic characteristics of each contest and contestant. These fixed effects also contribute to absorbing the systematic difference in the scoring criteria among different contests. If Hypothesis 1 is valid, the estimated 2 should be positive; that is, 2 > 0. This implies that the score difference increases as the contestants receive more feedback.
Submission Phase Model
In the submission phase of each contest, Kaggle requires the contestants to select final solutions because the contestants tend to upload more solutions than the contest requires during the learning phase.
To test Hypothesis 2, we examined whether solutions with high public scores are more likely to be selected than those with high private scores. To avoid measurement inconsistency among the contests, instead of including the actual public and private scores in the model, we used the rankings of the public and private scores relative to those of other solutions uploaded by the same contestant in the same contest (i.e., and ). Because the ranking of the solutions also depends on how many solutions a contestant has uploaded, we normalized the score ranks as follows:
We modeled the likelihood of different solutions being selected by using a conditional logit model. Assume each solution j uploaded by contestant i in contest c has a latent value . The likelihood of solution j being selected depends on the magnitude of , which can be represented as a function of both public scores and private scores, as follows:
where 1 , 2 , and 3 are the coefficients; and is the error term that follows a Gumbel (type 1 extreme value) distribution (Greene 2008) . Again, the fixed effects ( and ) are included to control for the idiosyncratic characteristics of each contestant and contest.
We used the dummy variable to indicate whether solution j is selected by contestant i in contest c as a final solution. Let = ( 1 , … , ) capture all the selected solutions by contestant i in contest c. Here, is the total number of solutions uploaded by contestant i in contest c. A closed form model can then be formulated as derived by Hosmer et al. (2013) .
where is a row vector consisting of the solution-variant variables (i.e., the variables in Model 5
excluding the fixed effects 6 ), is the corresponding coefficients column vector, is the number of solutions that can be selected in contest c, ic is a vector containing dummy variables with ∑ =1 =
, and is a set containing all possible 's that satisfy the condition ∑ =1 = . If Hypothesis 2 is valid, 2 > 3 ; that is, the solutions with high public scores are more likely to be selected than the solutions with high private scores.
Winner Performance
Because the winners define the outcome of the crowdsourcing contests, we examined whether the winners exhibited a stronger or weaker salience bias than the other contestants. To examine Hypothesis 3, we first investigated the sign of Δ for the solutions uploaded by contest winners using Wilcoxon signed rank test. We then identified the winners of the contests (the contestants who received a reward) with the indicator variable , where = 1 when contestant i is a winner of the contest c, and included it in our regression models. The main effect of is absorbed by the contestant fixed effect.
Thus, Models 2 and 5 were modified as Models 2´ and 5´, respectively.
If Hypothesis 3 is true, then the coefficient of #Feedback should remain positive for the winners in the learning phase model (Model 2´); that is, 2 + 3 > 0. Similarly, the solutions with high public scores should still have a higher likelihood of being selected than the solutions with high private scores in the submission phase model (Model 5´); that is, 2 + 4 > 3 + 5 . In the robustness check section, we also provide a subsample analysis, which estimates the model by using only the winners.
Moderating Effects of the Parallel Path Effect and Competition Effect
To test Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 5, we included the variables related to the total number of contestants. In both phases, we used the total number of contestants in contest c (log(# )) to capture how competitive the contest is as well as the magnitude of the parallel path effect. A log-transformation was used to correct the skewness of the variable (Gelman and Hill 2007) . Its main effect is absorbed by the contest fixed effect. Hence, the learning phase and submission phase models were modified as Models 2˝
and 5˝, respectively.
If the parallel path effect dominates the competition effect (Hypothesis 4a) during the learning phase, the marginal effect of the public score feedback among the winners should be reduced when the number of contestants increases; that is, 4 + 5 should be negative in Model 2˝. By contrast, if the competition effect dominates (Hypothesis 4b), the marginal effect of the feedback should be amplified when the number of contestants increases; hence, 4 + 5 should be positive in Model 2˝. Similarly, if a parallel path effect is at work, then according to Hypothesis 5, during the submission phase, the solutions with high public scores will be less likely to be selected by the winners as the number of contestants increases, and/or the solutions with high private scores will be more likely to be selected by the winners as the number of contestants increases; that is, 6 + 8 should be negative and/or 7 + 9 should be positive in Model 5˝.
Data and Empirical Analysis
The preceding section presents two models: the learning phase model and submission phase model.
In this section, we illustrate how the model coefficients are estimated. First, we describe the archival data from Kaggle used to estimate the model. Then, we provide some model free evidence for the hypothesized patterns in the presence of salience bias. Next, we present our empirical results from the Kaggle data and discuss the identification issue based on the results of a survey conducted among Kaggle contestants, and finally, perform robustness tests.
Data
In this study, we used an archival data set from Kaggle. The data set contains all completed contests until September 1, 2015. Because this study investigated how a salience bias can be created under the influence of feedback information (i.e., the public scores), we limited our scope by examining only those contests that implemented a public leaderboard. We also excluded those where overfitting was inapplicable (i.e., the contests were unrelated to predictive modeling). Furthermore, contestants may differ in how they value nonmonetary rewards. For example, some contests are hosted as classroom practice for machine learning classes, and other contests only provide points on Kaggle instead of a monetary reward. To be consistent, we used only those contests that offered monetary rewards. In total, among 239 contests in our data set, we identified 103 predictive modeling contests that provided monetary rewards (most of the other contests were in-class competitions). Table 2 presents a descriptive summary of the main variables.
Our sample comprised 44,827 teams with a total of 258 winning spots among all contests. Overall, the sample comprised 695,622 observations at the solution level. In each contest, we observed rule parameters including the reward size, number of winners, and percentage of the test set that contributed to the public score. We also observed every contestant submission and its public score, private score, 7 time of upload, contestant name, and whether it was selected by the contestant as a final solution. In each contest, a contestant can participate on his or her own, or several contestants can participate together as a team. A team once formed stays the same throughout the contest. In this paper, we use "team"
and "contestant" interchangeably. If several people participate as a team, they are treated no different from a single contestant, so they are expected to collaborate as a team to work towards the same goal (i.e., to win the contest). In our dataset, the average number of members in each team is approximately 1.15, suggesting that the majority of the teams have only one contestant. To prevent collusion among the contestants, Kaggle removes users who submit from multiple accounts or privately share between teams. The number of winning spots in a contest is typically between 1 and 3, and is predetermined before the contest starts.
Model Free Evidence
We started by exploring whether our hypothesized patterns for public and private scores in the presence of salience bias showed in our data. First, we conducted the Wilcoxon signed rank test to compare the public scores and private scores. The test results revealed that public scores are statistically larger than private scores at 1% significance level for all solutions, including the solutions uploaded by the winners.
Thus, the sign of the score difference hypothesized in Hypotheses 1 and 3 is supported.
Second, to examine the relationship between the score difference and the number of feedback, we divided the solutions into 50 equal-sized groups based on the number of feedback 8 , calculated the average standardized score difference and 95% confidence interval for each group of solutions, and then plotted their relationship with the number of feedback in Figure 2 . It shows that the score difference increases as more feedback is received, consistent with the pattern hypothesized in Hypothesis 2. Third, we examined whether public score ranking and private score ranking are aligned, that is, whether the solutions ranked better in public leaderboard are also ranked better in private leaderboard. As shown in Figure 3 , the ranking correspondence becomes insignificant as we move to the top of the leaderboard (the lower left corner of the graph). That is, the public leaderboard ranking becomes less representative of the final ranking as the public score ranking improves. This is likely because the contestants who are ranked best in public leaderboard are the ones overfitting the public scores and therefore perform worse in the final ranking (i.e., the private leaderboard).
In Table 3 , we also checked whether public score ranking and private score ranking are aligned by examining their correlations. Again, as we move up the public leaderboard, the correlation between public score ranking and private score ranking goes down quickly and eventually becomes close to zero and 8 If the number of feedback in two groups is the same, we then combined them into a single group.
insignificant. If we move up the private leaderboard, it shows a similar pattern, but the correlation numbers are generally higher than if we move up the public leaderboard. This suggests that compared to the contestants with the same position in the public leaderboard, the contestants who are ranked best in the private leaderboard are more likely to be at a similar rank in the public leaderboard. That is, the contestants who paid more attention to final performance are more likely to do well in both rankings than the contestants who are ranked high in the public leaderboard, likely due to salience bias and the overfitting tendency by the latter. 
Regression Results
The estimation results of our regression models are shown in Tables 4a and 4b . Robust standard errors clustered at the contestant level are reported in the parentheses 9 . In both tables, Column 1 presents the baseline models and shows evidence of the salience bias. The differences between the winners and other contestants are shown in Column 2, and the moderating effects of the parallel path effect and competition effect are shown in Column 3.
Our results suggest that a salience effect is persistent among contestants in both phases. In column (1) of Table 4a , the positive coefficient of log(# ) ( 2 ) indicates that the more feedback is received, the more salient the feedback information is, and the larger the score difference between public and private scores. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported, suggesting that the effect of salience bias is stronger for the contestants who receive more feedback. Similarly, Column 1 in Table 4b supports Hypothesis 2 because the coefficient difference between ̃ and ̃ is positive at the 1% significance level ( 2 > 3 ). This suggests that a solution with a high public score is more likely to be selected than a solution with a high private score.
Notably, in Column 1 of Table 4b , the private scores have a tangible influence on the solution selection process of the contestants. Although the private scores are not directly observed by the contestants during the contest, the statistical significance of the private scores likely captures the effect of crossvalidation. As shown in Abu-Mustafa et al. (2012) , the expected value of the error terms for cross-validation approximates the expected value of the out-of-sample error. Since the private score basically represents the expected value of the out-of-sample error, the private score can be considered as a proxy for the crossvalidation scores contestants obtain for their solutions.
In Column 2 of Tables 4a and 4b , we tested against the hypotheses 0 : 2 + 3 ≤ 0 and 0 : 2 + 4 ≤ 3 + 5 to determine whether Hypotheses 1 and 2 also hold for contest winners. Our results suggested that both hypotheses are rejected at the 1% significance level. Hence, the salience effect was still persistent among winners in our case, and Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Hypothesis 4 consists of two competing hypotheses. If the parallel path effect dominates in the learning phase, an increase in the number of contestants will reduce the effect of feedback on the score difference of the top contestants (i.e., 4 + 5 < 0). However, if the competition effect dominates, an increase in the number of contestants will amplify the effect of feedback on the score difference of the top contestants (i.e., 4 + 5 > 0). In Column 3 of Table 4a , the sum of the last two interaction terms (i.e., 4 + 5 ) is positive at the 5% significance level, which supports Hypothesis 4b that the competition effect dominates the parallel path effect during the learning phase; therefore, as the number of contestants increases, the winners are more likely to be influenced by the salience effect during the learning phase.
During the submission phase, the competition effect was at its minimum. As suggested by Hypothesis 5, the negative impact of the salience effect among the winners will be reduced when the number of contestants increases. In other words, the likelihood of a solution being selected as a final solution by the winners will be less associated with the public scores and/or more associated with the private scores as the number of contestants increases (i.e., 6 + 8 < 0 and/or 7 + 9 > 0). In Column 3 of Table 4b , the sum of the two interactions log(# ) × ̃ and × log(# ) × ̃ (i.e., 6 + 8 ) is insignificant, and the sum of the two interactions log(# ) × ̃ and × log(# ) × ̃ (i.e., 7 + 9 ) is positive at the 5% significance level. This suggests that among the winners, the solutions with high private scores were more likely to be selected as final solutions when there were more contestants. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the parallel path effect dominates during the submission phase. Hence, Hypothesis 5 is supported.
Identification of the Salience Bias
The empirical approach used in this study is different from the typical causal relationship identified in an econometrics analysis, in that we are not directly modeling the decision process of each team. Instead, we examine in retrospect if the pattern we observe in the data is consistent with pattern A (i.e., the pattern we should observe in the absence of salience bias) or pattern B (i.e., the pattern we should observe in the presence of salience bias). By showing that the pattern we observe is consistent with pattern B and by eliminating other factors that may cause B, we conclude that salience bias is present. Hence, a concern here is whether the pattern we observe is driven by other alternative explanations. In this section, we address this concern by 1) utilizing exogenous variations in the salience level of public score feedback to show that the pattern we observe gets stronger when the feedback is more salient, as an additional direct support to our salience bias explanation, and 2) ruling out alternative explanations.
Exogenous Variation -Additional Cues
Some Kaggle contests remind contestants of the difference between public and private scores or stress the importance of private scores in their contest description, while others do not. For example, in one Kaggle contest, its description explicitly mentions that: The predictions on test data will remain hidden on the "private leaderboard" until they are revealed at the end of the challenge. The final ranking and determination of the winners will be based on the "private leaderboard" test data results. Information like this provides an additional cue to the contestants by reminding them of the importance of the private scores, thus likely counterweighing the salient influence of the public scores. The contestants in such contests are expected to pay more attention to cross-validation, thus having a smaller salience bias.
We thus use a dummy variable to indicate if contest c explicitly mentions the difference between the public scores and the private scores or stresses the importance of private scores. If the pattern we observe is indeed driven by the salience bias, then the contestants in these contests should be less subject to salience bias, and so the effect of salience bias should be smaller in these contests. The results, shown in Tables 5a and 5b , are indeed consistent with the salience bias explanation. Specifically, in the learning phase, × log (# ) is negative and significant, meaning that the effect of salience bias is smaller if =1. In the submission phase, ×̃is negative and significant and ×̃ is positive and significant, meaning that the solutions with high public scores are less likely to be selected as final submissions if =1. 
Exogenous Variation -Number of Feedback
Another variation we observe is the number of feedback each team receives. The more feedback is received, the more salient the feedback information is. Thus, by showing that the effect of salience bias increases as the feedback information becomes more salient (i.e., as more feedback is received), we can directly support the salience bias explanation that we propose. We already used the number of feedback as the key variable in the learning phase to directly capture the salience level of feedback information (in Table   4a ). Similar to the learning phase, we can also examine how the salience level of feedback information moderates the effect of salience bias by including the total number of feedback each team receives (# ) as a moderating variable in the submission phase (its main effect is absorbed by the contestant fixed effect). The results (Table 6 ) are consistent with the salience bias explanation. When the public score is more salient (i.e., # is higher), the effect of salience bias gets stronger.
Specifically, log (# ) has a positive moderating effect on both public score and private score (in Column (1)) but its effect on public score is greater at 1% statistical significance level. 
Alternative Explanations
There are possible alternative explanations behind the patterns that we observe in our results. In this section, we perform additional analyses and present additional evidence from the results of a survey of actual Kaggle contestants to rule out these alternative explanations. First, our results could be driven by the data given, e.g., if training set is smaller than or systematically different from the test set, or the portion of the test set used for deriving public scores is larger than the portion of the test set used for deriving private scores. To address this concern, we conducted a sub-sample analysis by excluding the contests that 1) mention any difference between training set and test set 10 , 2) have a training set smaller than the test set, or 3) use over 50% of the test set for calculating public scores. The results (Tables 7a and 7b ) are consistent with our main results that score differences increase significantly as the number of feedback increases in the learning phase and that solutions with high public score are significantly more likely to be selected than solutions with high private scores in the submission phase.
Second, contestants are not aware of or are not good at cross validation. To rule out this alternative explanation, we conducted a sub-sample analysis by including only the contestants who have expressed their opinions about cross-validation on the contest's forum. If a contestant has participated in discussions related to cross-validation, then it is reasonable to assume that these contestants know what cross-validation is. The results are in Tables 8a and 8b . In Column (1), we analyzed the solutions by these contestants in all the contests they participated in. In Column (2), we analyzed the solutions by these contestants only in the contests for which the cross-validation discussion occurred. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
We also examined the results for high-ability contestants, such as contest winners and experienced contestants who should know about cross-validation. The results are in the next two sections, and are again consistent with our main results. agree that cross-validation is as equally reliable as or more reliable than the public scores. d) In retrospect, the majority of the respondents (68 out of 101) think that the solutions selected based on cross-validation have a higher private score than the solutions selected based on the public scores, and very few (13 out of 101) think that the solutions selected based on public scores have a higher private score. e) In retrospect, most of the respondents (79 out of 101) think they should have paid more attention to cross-validation.
These observations suggest that Kaggle contestants do receive cues from both public scores and cross-validation, they consider cross-validation more reliable and in retrospect, they wish they have done more cross-validation and selected solutions based on cross-validation. However, the patterns we observe in the data suggest that they still over-emphasized the feedback from public scores, rather than relying on their own cross-validation. This is likely due to the cognitive bias (i.e., the salience bias) that they were not aware of when they were competing in the contests. The survey results confirm that contestants are aware of alternative evaluation methods for their solutions (i.e., cross-validation), and acknowledge that they may be superior to the public scores provided by Kaggle. However, the data collected from Kaggle and our analysis suggests that contestants' behavior appears to be more consistent with behavior driven by public scores.
Robustness Analyses
In this section, we ran additional specifications of our model to ensure that our results were robust.
First, every time a contestant uploads a solution online, the contestant receives the public score for the 11 We manually went over the list of contestants on Kaggle and collected 490 emails from their Kaggle profile. A summary of the respondents' background information is in Tables A7a, A7b and A7c in the Online Appendix.
solution as the feedback. Because the number of uploaded solutions and the score difference may be both affected by the unobserved individual characteristics, in addition to including contestant fixed effect, we model the number of feedback as an endogenous variable in our first robustness analysis. Specifically, we used the maximum number of solutions allowed ( ), which equals the number of solutions allowed per team per day multiplied by the number of days elapsed since the first solution was submitted by the team, as the instrumental variable (IV) for the number of feedback. Because the maximum number of solutions allowed is pre-determined at the beginning of the contest and contestants tend to upload more solutions when they are allowed, this IV is strongly correlated with the number of feedback received but is uncorrelated with the error term, thus making it a valid IV for our analysis. Our results are in Tables   A1a and A1b in the Online Appendix. Because the number of feedback only shows up in the learning phase, we only did this analysis for the learning phase model. All the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Second, instead of using a Winner dummy, we conducted a sub-sample analysis by only using the solutions of winners to directly test hypotheses H3-H5. Our results are in Tables A2a and A2b in the Online Appendix and remain qualitatively unchanged.
Third, because the number of participating teams changes over time during the contests, contestants may observe the number of contestants at different time points. Although this has a relatively small effect on the submission phrase (because it typically happens at the end of a contest), this may change the influence of the competition effect at different times during the learning phase, depending on the number of participating teams at the moment the contestants are working on a new solution. Hence, instead of using the total number of teams in contest c (# ), we used the number of participating teams before contestant i uploaded solution j in contest c (# ) to re-examine the competition effect during the learning phase. The results are in Table A3 in the Online Appendix and are consistent with our main results.
Fourth, to ensure that our results are not driven by excluding the contests with non-monetary rewards, we included these contests and re-ran our analysis. The results are in Tables A4a and A4b in the Online Appendix and remain qualitatively the same.
Individual Characteristics and Contest Characteristics
Given that a salience bias exists in crowdsourcing contests, an effective strategy for eliminating its effect should be sought. In this section, we explore how the individual characteristics and contest characteristics potentially affect the influence of the salience bias on the Kaggle platform. In particular, experienced contestants tend to be more rational (List 2003) , and therefore should be less subject to salience bias. For the contest characteristics, we investigated how the reward size moderates the influence of the salience bias. Previous studies have reported that extrinsic reward is a major incentive for contestants to invest effort in solving problems on such platforms (e.g., Liu et al. 2014) . Hence, the size of a reward ( ) would have a similar moderating effect as a competition effect.
Again, we took a log-transformation of the variables and to correct the skewness of the variables (Gelman and Hill 2007) . Then, we moderated the salience bias-related variables with these two characteristics variables. The results are in Tables A5a and A5b in the Online Appendix. The interaction log( ) × log(# ) in Table A5a is insignificant, suggesting that reliance on the public scores did not increase with experience during the learning phase. Table A5b further shows that, during the submission phase, the solutions with high public scores were less likely to be selected as final solutions by experienced contestants. Hence, contestants' experience may actually facilitate reducing salience bias. This also coincides with the anecdotal evidence provided by Sismanis (2010) .
The high statistical significance of the positive moderation effect in Table A5a suggests that rewards serve as a stimulus that drives the contestants to exert more effort, thus increasing the competition effect during the learning phase, but its effect in the submission phase is unsigned, consistent with the argument that the competition effect should be at the minimum in the submission phase.
Discussion and Conclusion
Elucidating the pitfalls and benefits of using platforms could assist future researchers and practitioners in integrating online platforms into their business strategies. This study used a crowdsourcing platform to illustrate how individual biases can affect the productivity of the platform. Specifically, we examined how the negative impact of the salience bias can be eliminated or attenuated on a crowdsourcing platform. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to address this issue, from which several crucial results were obtained: Studies related to crowdsourcing contests have typically followed the doctrine of rationality (e.g., Terwiesch and Xu 2008) . However, without considering the behavioral aspects of the agents, the quality of the crowdsourcing outcome could be low. The findings of this study elucidate how individual biases can change the outcome of crowdsourcing contests. Seekers and platform designers should be aware of the possibility of creating inferior outcomes because of systematic biases. One plausible remedy is to provide training to the contestants to raise their awareness of such behavioral anomalies.
Another implication of these results is that, although the competition effect fosters greater effort from high-ability contestants (Boudreau et al. 2016) , if the contestants' objective is influenced by systematic bias, the competition effect may actually be detrimental to the overall outcome. For example, in our case, the high-ability contestants expended greater effort in the face of higher competition, but their effort was spent more on overfitting in response to the salient public scores. Thus, contest holders should be more aware of the downside of over-incentivizing contestants.
Although our results may not directly apply to other crowdsourcing sites that do not have an equivalent feature of public scores, our findings suggest the importance for platforms and contest holders to pay attention to the potential cognitive bias likely induced by in-progress feedback especially when it is not perfectly aligned with the objective of the contest. Furthermore, although this study investigated only the impact of the salience bias, the results potentially cautions about the influence of other systematic biases as well on crowdsourcing outcomes. For example, innovation processes tend to depend on leadership style and instruction (Basu and Green 1997, Ruscio and Amabile 1999) . Seekers' perceptions of a certain type of solution or unintended misleading instruction might also systematically affect the outcome of the contestants' performance. Our results suggest that it may also affect the overall performance of all crowdsourcing workers in a contest. However, the effect on the winners can be smaller.
Increasing the number of contestants can initiate both the parallel path effect and the competition effect. While the parallel path effect can attenuate the influence of salience bias on the winners' solutions, the competition effect works in the opposite direction. Contest holders should be aware of how contest characteristics such as the level of difficulty, the rewards, and the timing of a contest launched may affect the number of participants. Perhaps, platform designers should also investigate the possibility of reducing systematic bias by manipulating the information presented on their platforms, e.g., by making the information about the number of contestants less noticeable. Hence, the competition effect could be less severe and the parallel path effect may still be preserved because the overall number of contestants remains the same. In addition, our result suggests that reminding the contestants about the potential cognitive biases can help reduce their influence. For example, explicitly reminding the difference between the public and private scores in the context description or emphasizing the importance of cross-validation through data partitioning to look for generalized predictive models can remind the contestants of the salience bias so that they can be less influenced.
We also investigated several contest-and individual-related characteristics that may affect the influence of the salience bias. The results provide additional suggestions for platform owners regarding how to reduce systematic bias and improve solution outcomes. In line with the explanation of related theories, when the reward size is larger, it also induces more effort in evaluating or creating solutions.
Therefore, such contest features exacerbate the impact of the salience bias. Furthermore, we also found that experienced contestants may exhibit less cognitive bias and focus more on the final result. In contrast to conventional wisdom where a crowd functions at their peak performance when it comprises a diverse group of workers (e.g. Ren et al. 2016) , platform designers should encourage more experienced contestants to participate in their contests.
This study emphasizes a potential downside of providing in-progress feedback in crowdsourcing contests. Because we do not observe what would happen if public scores were not provided in our context, we are not able to draw conclusions on its overall effect, since providing in-progress feedback can also have upsides, such as encouraging participation. This is a limitation of the study and should be addressed by future research.
